Democratization and State Capacity
Philippe C. Schmitter, Claudius Wagemann and Anastassia Obydenkova
When a polity "transits" from some form of autocracy to something else, what happens to the capacity of its State apparatus? And, if that something else becomes some form of democracy, does that distinctive, more-or-less centralized institution with a monopoly over the legitimate use of collective violence for a specific territory and population (cf. Max Weber) gain or lose in material resources, voluntary compliance, coercive means and/or symbolic presence? Is democracy intrinsically hostile to the State, as many liberals claim? Or, does it provide a more reliable base for the implementation of collective decisions, as many socialists and social democrats believe?
No single study is going to provide a definitive answer to these questions. They have long been debated between political forces within well-established democracies -without any compelling result. Moreover, as we have just seen, there is every reason to believe that the terms of reference have changed in recent decades. Since 1974, over 60 countries have attempted a transition to democracy and the vast majority of these neo-democracies have not regressed to some form of overt autocracy -as was the case in the past. Even more surprising, they have entered into this process of regime change under an extraordinary variety of initial conditions. They have differed in levels of economic development, social structure, geo-strategic location, extent of international threat, size of country, ethno-linguistic heterogeneity, cultural tradition, religious belief system and, of course, pre-existing State capacity.
The principal focus of this analysis will be on the impact of democratization upon State capacity in the former communist countries of Central-Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. It is there that we have reasons to believe that the impact has been the greatest, if only because the role of the State (or, better, party-State) was so much greater prior to the change in regime. Under conditions of multiple, simultaneous transformation in several spheres of human activity, especially in the type of economy, the form of political domination, the position in international alliances and even in the identity and borders of the State, it can be expected that these established institutions will be most challenges and changes the most dramatic.
However, this should not be an excuse for treating them in isolation. It is only if we can "capture" them in relation to the evolution of State capacity in all contemporary polities and, in particular, to those that have recently undergone regime change that we will be able to the ways in which they may respond in particular ways to such a challenge. Therefore, we will start at the broadest possible level of analysis.
There follows four quantitative analyses of patterns of State spending and taxation, ranging in coverage from all of the world's polities, to those that have recently attempted to democratize their regimes and, finally, to those that have made a transition from autocratic communist rule. The latter, alas, is incomplete due to lack of relevant data.
The article has two conclusions: one empirical in which the findings are summarized; the other theoretical in which the implications of "governance" for State capacity in the future is discussed.
Boletín Reforme N° 397
