Beyond "Washington Consensus"? An Approach from the Politics of some Proposals of the World Bank on Institutional Reform
Carlos M. Vilas
The State reform agenda for many Latin American and developing countries is based on the approaches of the World Bank and other multilateral financial organisations. At the beginning, the emphasis of reforms was put on a number of policies to shrink the State and transfer most intervention activities to the market. These recommendations were called the "Washington Consensus." They arose in the context of fiscal and financial problems resulting from the 1980´s crisis in Latin America. Following a decade of reforms in hundreds of countries, experience shows that the ratio of size to efficacy of State institutions is not linear. Additionally, the optimum performance of the market requires an effective institutional network to prevent imbalances and hold responsibility for activities that are not attractive to private investment.
A number of documents issued by the World Bank in the 1990´s set out the strategy and main policies to be implemented by developing countries in order to adjust their State structures to the "Consensus" reforms and provide more governance. This would be an answer to the need of going beyond "Washington Consensus," or toward a "Post-Washington Consensus."
In this paper, the extent and restrictions of the new proposal are discussed from a political viewpoint. Emphasis is put on power configurations that underlie the recommendations of the organisation. There are two variables in the new agenda of institutional reform -a doctrine variable to complete the "Consensus" programme of reforms, and a pragmatic variable to restructure some premises for a more balanced effect in economic and social terms. Both variables -although different regarding the scope of the State- give priority to management instruments concerning development goals; reduce politics to administration, and downplay the State as a historical component and institutional construction.
Boletín Reforme N° 397
